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RECENT DECISIONS
case that any such regulation will have to provide for some method
of assisting needy children before it will be allowed. The important
point to remember here is that AFDC is intended to benefit children
and not the children's mothers. Any regulation which terminates this
aid for a reason other than need or act of the individual child himself
would be wholly illogical unless the child is provided for in some other
manner. The majority opinion is restricted to the issue of a mother's
immorality in respect to the termination of aid. Although Justice
Douglas' opinion was broader than necessary for a determination of
this case, his argument is appealing and may be important in future
problems in this area. WILLIAM CROKE
Torts: Negligence-Policeman In Performance of Duties
Allowed Recovery As Invitee: In Cameron v. Abatiell' a city police-
man was injured when steps leading to the back door of a business
building collapsed while he was following his usual routine of checking
for fires. The Vermont Court, in determining the liability of the owner,
was concerned with the status of a policeman rightfully on the premises
in the performance of his duties. The court held that the policeman
was entitled to recover from the possessor of the premises, since he
enjoyed the status of a business invitee. The court stated:
In this case, as in cases of a public employee, the policeman
covering the Center Street beat could reasonably be anticipated
and expected not only as to time (in the evening after closing
hours) but also as to the exact place. Thus, the defendants had
a reasonable opportunity to make the premises safe or to warn
the plaintiff of any dangerous condition. It was within the
reasonable foresight of the .defendants of what was likely to
happen if the steps leading to the rear door became in disrepair.
The plaintiff was not using the stairway to the rear door in an
emergency in the discharge of his police duties. His entry on the
steps was not to make an arrest or chase a thief or burglar. The
circumstances of this case distinguish it from those cases arising
in other jurisdictions which deny recovery.
[W] e conclude that the relationship between the plaintiff and
defendants is in essence that of a business visitor, or invitee, on
the premises. Accordingly, the rules of protection from injury
applicable to such class of persons are controlling.2
However, the majority of American courts have classified police-
men entering premises in performance of their duties as mere licencees. 3
1241 Ad2d 310 (Vt. 1968).
2 Id. at 314-15.
3 See Louisville & N. R.R. Co. v. Griswold, 241 Ala. 104, 1 So. 2d 393 (1941);
Pincock v. McCoy, 48 Idaho 227, 281 P. 371 (1929); Carroll v. Hemenway,
315 Mass. 45, 51 N.E2d 952 (1943) ; Scheurer v. Trustees of the Open Bible




The case of Davy v. Greenlaw4 expresses the position taken by most
jurisdictions:
At common law, policemen ... by the great weight of authority,
are held to have only the rights of mere licensees to whom the
property owner if he knows of their presence owes only a duty
to warn of dangers which he knows and which are not open to
ordinary observation.
5
A question arises, then, as to what the differences and controlling
rules are if a policeman is classified in one instance as an invitee and
in another as a licensee. An invitee, according to the Restatement of
Torts, may be either a public invitee or business visitor. A public in-
vitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on the land as a
member of the public.6 A business visitor is a person who is invited
to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly 6r indirectly connected
with business dealings with the possessor of the land.
7
The Restatement distinguishes between two types of business visit-
ors. The first type includes persons who are invited to come upon the
land for a purpose connected with the business for which the land is
held open to the public, as where a person enters a shop to make a pur-
chase." The second type includes those who come upon the land not
open to the public, for a purpose connected with the business which the
possessor conducts upon the land, or for a purpose connected with their
own business which is connected with any purpose, business or other-
wise, for which the possessor uses the land.9
A licensee, as defined by the Restatement, "[I]s a person who is
privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's
consent."' 01 Social guests, members of the possessor's household, and
one whose presence upon the land is solely for his own purpose are
commonly placed in this category.
The court further distinguishes the duties owed by the possessor to an
invitee or licensee on the basis of whether the negligence consisted of
a dangerous condition or dangerous activity. In Cameron, the court was
principally concerned with a dangerous condition-a step in disrepair.
In section 343 of the Restatement of Torts, entitled "Dangerous Con-
ditions Known to or Discoverable by Possessor," a possessor of land
is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a con-
dition on the land if, but only if, he:
4101 N.H. 134, 135 A.2d 900 (1957).
5 Id. at 134, 135 A.2d at 901.
6 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 (1965).
71d.
Id., § 332, comment e At 179.
9 Id., § 332, comment e at 180.
10 Id., § 330.
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(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would dis-
cover the condition, and should realize that it involves an un-
reasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the
danger or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against
the danger."
On the other hand, under section 342 of the Restatement, entitled
"Dangerous Conditions Known to Possessor," a possessor of land is
subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition
on the land if, but only if,
(a) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condi-
tion and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to such licensees, and should expect that they will not dis-
cover or realize the danger, and
(b) he fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condi-
tion safe, or to warn the licensees of the condition and the risk
involved, and
(c) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the
condition and the risk involved. 2
Thus, the basic difference between sections 342 and 343 is that the
possessor of land has no duty to prepare a safe place for the licensee's
reception or to inspect the land to discover possible, or even probable,
dangers. His only duty is to disclose dangerous conditions known to
him. On the other hand, an invitee is entitled to expect that the pos-
sessor will take reasonable care to ascertain the actual condition of the
premises, that the land has been prepared and made ready and safe for
his reception, or that the possessor will give warning of the actual con-
dition and the risk involved therein.
The Restatement also defines the liability of a possessor of land
in relation to those entering in the exercise of a privilege and inde-
pendently of the possessor's consent. Section 345 of the Restatement
says:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), the liability of a
possessor of land to one who enters the land only in the exercise
of a privilege, for either a public or private purpose, and irre-
spective of the possessor's consent, is the same as the liability to
a licensee.
(2) The liability of a possessor of land to a public officer
or employee who enters the land in the performance of his public
duty, and suffers harm because of a condition of a part of the
land held open to the public, is the same as the liability to an in-
vitee.' 3
"I Id., § 343.12 Id., § 342.
'3 Id., § 345.
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In effect, this section suggests that a policeman calling during business
hours at a store or an office to make an inquiry should be classified as
an invitee, whereas if he comes at midnight or enters by the fire escape,
or enters in pursuit of a criminal, his classification is that of a licensee.
The distinction seems to lie in the time, place, and regularity of the
officer's visit.14
However, as Professor William Prosser has stated, "[T]he courts
have encountered considerable difficulty in dealing with public officials
who come upon the land in exercise of a legal privilege and the per-
formance of a public duty. Such individuals do not fit very well into
any of the more or less arbitrary categories which the law has estab-
lished."15
The question remains as to why, in most instances, policemen
are classified licensees. A host of positions has been advanced in sup-
port of the licensee categorization. The same arguments likewise apply
to firemen who have, in most instances, been categorized as licensees.16
The most logical reason put forth is that policemen are likely to enter
the premises at unforeseeable times, upon unusual parts of the premises,
and under circumstances of emergency where care in the preparation
for their visit cannot be reasonably expected.' 7 In support of this con-
tention, one author has stated:
The broad range of such a duty, the impossibility of forecasting
the precise point to which the officer's duties may call him, the
infrequency of his probable visits, all clearly preclude the idea
that the balance of social benefit can require such a serious re-
striction on the owner's use of his land, or justify the imposition
of such a burden on his exchequer, to prevent so vague a risk of
so improbable an injury.'8
The same author further states that:
It would be an obviously unreasonable burden to impose on land-
owners to require them to keep the whole of their premises in
such condition as to make every part of it safe for those whose
unusual and exceptional right of entry may never accrue. 19
14 Prosser, Business Visitors and Intitees, 26 MINN. L. Rzv. 573, 611 (1942).
'5 W. PRossE, LAW OF ToRTs § 61, at 405 (3d ed. 1964).86See Roberts v. Rosenblatt, 146 Conn. 110, 148 A.2d 142 (1959); Baxley v.
Williams Constr. Co., 98 Ga. App. 662, 106 S.E.2d 799 (1958); Aldworth v.F. W. Woolworth Co., 295 Mass. 344, 3 N.E.2d 1008 (1936); Hamilton v.
Minneapolis Desk Mfg. Co., 78 Minn. 3, 80 N.W. 693 (1899); Anderson v.Cinnamon, 365 Mo. 304, 282 S.W.2d 445 (1955); Krauth v. Geller, 31 N.J.270, 157 A.2d 129 (1960); Note, 48 GEo. L. J. 187 (1959). Contra, Dini v.
Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960).
1'See Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 45 N.W2d
549 (1951); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 345, comment c at 228 (1965);
Note, 26 COLUM. L. Rv. 116 (1926); Note, 22 MINN. L. REv. 898 (1938).
Is Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those Entering His Premises
of Their Own Right, 69 PENN. L. Rtv. 142, 351 (1920).
19 Id. at 350-51.
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Policemen have also been classified as licensees because possessors
of land might be deterred from calling such officials if their tort lia-
bility or imposed duty were extended. 20 However, it is unlikely that a
possessor of land, even if he knew the extent of his legal duties, would
be deterred by fear of tort liability when a threat to his life or property
was imminent.21
It has been further argued that policemen enter premises under a
license conferred by law, primarily for the benefit of the public, and
that this privilege is the implied permission necessary to classify such
officers as licensees. 2 The contention that such entry is licensed by the
public interest is often referred to as the "law of overruling necessity. '23
Policemen are not invitees because they are not invited by the possessor
of the land. This line of reasoning has been criticized as follows:
If the public officer is not an "invitee" because his right to enter
does not depend on an invitation extended to him and because
he enters, even if summoned by the owner, in the performance
of his duty as public officer and not in acceptance of the invita-
tion, it is equally clear that he is not a "licensee" of the owner,
since his entry is no more referable to a permission than to an
invitation.24
Both licensees and invitees enter upon the premises with the consent of
the possessor; the former are tolerated and the latter are solicited. In
the case of policemen, consent is irrelevant since, if the conditions call-
ing for their entry exist, they enter the premises as of right. They act
neither by permission nor invitation.25
Courts have not, generally, placed other types of public officials,
who are not required to enter on a premises in performance of their
duties, in the category of licensee. Those who enter land in the exercise
of a privilege conferred by authority of law, regardless of the posses-
sor's consent, may have the status of an invitee. If they come for a
purpose directly or indirectly connected with the business of the posses-
sor, they are entitled to the greater protection afforded invitees under
the rules stated in sections 341A and 343 of the Restatement. Thus, a
building 6 or safety inspector2 7 who enters business premises to perform
his public duties is an invitee since his presence is closely connected
20 Shypulski v. Waldorf Paper Products Co., 232 Minn. 394, 397-98, 45 N.W.2d
549,551 (1951).
212 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27:14, at 1503 (1956).
2 2 See Comment, 35 MIcH. L. REv. 1157 (1937).
23 Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Fryar, 132 Tenn. 612, 179 S.W. 127 (1915).
24 Bohlen, supra note 18, at 344.
25 Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N.Y. 10, 127 N.E. 491 (1920).
26 See Miller v. Pacific Constructors, Inc., 68 Cal. App. 2d 529, 157 P.2d 57
(1945); Fred Howland, Inc. v. Morris, 143 Fla. 189, 196 So. 472 (1940);
Henryetta Constr. Co. v .Hanis, 408 P.2d 522 (Okla. 1968).
27 See Cudahy Packing Co. v. McBride, 92 F.2d 737 (8th Cir. 1937); Hyatt v.
Murray, 101 Minn. 507, 112 N.W. 881 (1907); Mitchell v. Barton & Co., 126
Wash. 232, 217 P. 993 (1923).
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with the business conducted there and may even be indispensable to it.
The same is true of public officials who enter a private residence for
the purpose of some business with the possessor. This includes a gar-
bage collector28 or water meter reader. 29 It is not necessary that the
presence of the visitor be in any way of pecuniary advantage to the
possessor. A tax" or customs collector"' who enters to perform his
public duty is an invitee. The basis for classifying such officials as in-
vitees is well expressed by an Ohio court:
The entry of public employees, other than policemen and fire-
men, occurs during regular business hours, and such entry can
reasonably be anticipated not only as to time, but also as to place.
The owner has a reasonable opportunity to make the premises
safe or to warn them of any dangerous condition. 32
However, one author has criticized the blanket classification of public
officials as invitees:
The functions of building inspector, revenue agent, or health
inspector are thrust upon the occupier by the compulsion of law
as an unsought and often resented price of building or of doing
business. The freedom of choice to admit or exclude the visitor
that is so essential to ordinary invitation is entirely lacking; the
only benefit that accrues to the occupier is the fruit of compul-
sion. 3 3
Although most courts continue strictly to classify policemen as
licensees, some courts have departed from the rigidity of the rule. The
most notable departure is an Illinois case that dealt with the status
of firemen and, by reference, of policemen. In the case of Dini v.
Naiditch34 a fireman was injured by the collapse of a wooden staircase
while fighting a blaze in the defendant's hotel. The Supreme Court of
Illinois said that a fireman rightfully on the premises of another may
recover for the possessor's failure to exercise reasonable care in the
maintenance of his property when the injury occurred in a part of the
premises where firemen might reasonably be expected to be present.
The court rejected the rigidity of classifying firemen as licensees in all
circumstances:
[I]t is our opinion that since the common-law rule labelling fire-
men as licensees is but an illogical anachronism, originating in
a vastly different social order and pock-marked by judicial re-
28 Toomey v. Sanborn, 146 Mass. 28, 14 N.E. 921 (1888).29 See Sheffield Co. v. Phillips, 69 Ga. App. 41, 24 S.E.2d 834 (1943); Kennedy
v. Heisen, 182 Ill. App. 200 (1913).
30 Anderson & Nelson Distilling Co. v. Hair, 103 Ky. 196, 44 S.W. 658 (1898).
21 Wilson v. Union Iron Works Dry Dock Co., 167 Cal. 539, 140 P. 250 (1914).
32 Scheurer v. Trustees of the Open Bible Church, 175 Ohio St. 163, 171, 192
N.E.2d 38, 43 (1963).
3 2 F. HARPER AND F. JAMES, supra note 21, at 1500.
34 Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960). See also Note, 47
CORNELL L. Q. 119 (1961); Note, 14 VAND. L. REv. 1541 (1961).
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finements, it should not be perpetuated in the name of "stare
decisis." That doctrine does not confine our courts to the "Calf-
Path," nor to any rule currently enjoying a numerical superiority
of adherents. "Stare decisis" ought not be the excuse for a de-
cision where reason is lacking.3 5
CONCLUSION
Attempting to classify policemen as licensees in all circumstances
is antithetical to the law's characteristic flexibility. A rational approach
to the problem is to classify policemen according to the factual situation
of each case.
In Cameron, the decision to classify the policeman as an invitee
evidenced a rational approach. First, the plaintiff's presence on the
premises was as a visitor in the interest of public safety, but primarily
for the protection of the defendant's property. A regular pattern of
activity had been established. Thus, in this case a serious objection to
classifying policemen as invitees is eliminated, the impossibility of
forecasting the precise place to which the officer's duties may call him
and the infrequency of his improbable visits. Secondly, the policeman,
when descending defendant's staircase, did not do so in an unusual
manner or in an emergency situation. Thus, the circumstances of this
case differentiate it from those cases arising in other jurisdictions which
deny recovery. Under these particular circumstances, the officer had
a right to assume that the premises, aside from obvious dangers, were
reasonably safe for the purpose for which he was upon them and that
proper precautions had been taken to make them so.
Cameron establishes that it is the nature of the service, and not the
official designation of the person rendering it, which should determine
the relationship and resulting liability of the parties. The case does not
represent a radical departure, but rather a rational analysis of the facts
of the case in the light of the law as the court viewed it.
MARTIN L. GREENBERG
Contracts: Infant's Disaffirmance; Infant's Right to Void: In
Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc.,' the plaintiff, an emancipated, twen-
ty-year-old minor, married, and employed on a full-time basis, purchased
a second-hand station wagon from the defendant, Fred Howe Motors,
Inc. After paying the full purchase price of $412.00 and signing the de-
fendant's standard sales contract,2 the plaintiff took possession of the
vehicle. Some time later, the minor experienced difficulty with the auto
which he claimed was caused by a cracked block. After the dealer failed
35 170 N.E.2d at 885-86.139 Wis. 2d 20, 158 N.W.2d 288 (1968).
2 The sales contract contained the following clause: "I represent that I am 21
years of age or over and recognize that the dealer sells the above vehicle
upon this representation." Id. at 28, 158 N.W.2d at 292.
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